Key Publications
2017
van den Hoven, J; Miller, S; Pogge, T
Designing in Ethics Book
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: design, ethics, philosophy
@book{vandenHoven2017,
title = {Designing in Ethics},
author = {J van den Hoven and S Miller and T Pogge},
url = {http://jeroenv1.sg-host.com/book/designing-in-ethics-2017/},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-10-26},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
abstract = {Many of our interactions in the twenty-first century - both good and bad - take place by means of institutions, technology, and artefacts. We inhabit a world of implements, instruments, devices, systems, gadgets, and infrastructures. Technology is not only something that we make, but is also something that in many ways makes us. The discipline of ethics must take this constitutive feature of institutions and technology into account; thus, ethics must in turn be embedded in our institutions and technology. The contributors to this book argue that the methodology of 'designing in ethics' - addressing and resolving the issues raised by technology through the use of appropriate technological design - is the way to achieve this integration. They apply their original methodology to a wide range of institutions and technologies, using case studies from the fields of healthcare, media and security. Their volume will be important for philosophical practitioners and theorists alike.},
keywords = {design, ethics, philosophy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Many of our interactions in the twenty-first century - both good and bad - take place by means of institutions, technology, and artefacts. We inhabit a world of implements, instruments, devices, systems, gadgets, and infrastructures. Technology is not only something that we make, but is also something that in many ways makes us. The discipline of ethics must take this constitutive feature of institutions and technology into account; thus, ethics must in turn be embedded in our institutions and technology. The contributors to this book argue that the methodology of 'designing in ethics' - addressing and resolving the issues raised by technology through the use of appropriate technological design - is the way to achieve this integration. They apply their original methodology to a wide range of institutions and technologies, using case studies from the fields of healthcare, media and security. Their volume will be important for philosophical practitioners and theorists alike.
2010
van den Hoven, Jeroen
The Use of Normative Theories in Computer Ethics Book Chapter
In: Floridi, Luciano (Ed.): The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, Chapter 4, pp. 60-76, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Computer Science, Ethical issues, information society, IT-artefacts, philosophy
@inbook{vandenHoven2010,
title = {The Use of Normative Theories in Computer Ethics},
author = {Jeroen van den Hoven },
editor = {Luciano Floridi},
url = {https://d1rkab7tlqy5f1.cloudfront.net/TBM/Over%20faculteit/Afdelingen/Values%2C%20Technology%20and%20Innovation/People/Full%20Professors/The_use_of_normative_theories_in_computer_ethics.pdf},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-04-15},
booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics},
pages = {60-76},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
address = {Cambridge},
chapter = {4},
abstract = {Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have profoundly changed many aspects of life, including the nature of entertainment, work, communication, education, healthcare, industrial production and business, social relations and conflicts. They have had a radical and widespread impact on our moral lives and hence on contemporary ethical debates. The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, first published in 2010, provides an ambitious and authoritative introduction to the field, with discussions of a range of topics including privacy, ownership, freedom of speech, responsibility, technological determinism, the digital divide, cyber warfare, and online pornography. It offers an accessible and thoughtful survey of the transformations brought about by ICTs and their implications for the future of human life and society, for the evaluation of behaviour, and for the evolution of moral values and rights. It will be a valuable book for all who are interested in the ethical aspects of the information society in which we live.},
keywords = {Computer Science, Ethical issues, information society, IT-artefacts, philosophy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have profoundly changed many aspects of life, including the nature of entertainment, work, communication, education, healthcare, industrial production and business, social relations and conflicts. They have had a radical and widespread impact on our moral lives and hence on contemporary ethical debates. The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, first published in 2010, provides an ambitious and authoritative introduction to the field, with discussions of a range of topics including privacy, ownership, freedom of speech, responsibility, technological determinism, the digital divide, cyber warfare, and online pornography. It offers an accessible and thoughtful survey of the transformations brought about by ICTs and their implications for the future of human life and society, for the evaluation of behaviour, and for the evolution of moral values and rights. It will be a valuable book for all who are interested in the ethical aspects of the information society in which we live.
1997
van den Hoven, J
Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing Journal Article
In: 1997.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: moral constraints, panoptic technologies, philosophy, privacy
@article{vandenHoven1997,
title = {Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing},
author = {J van den Hoven },
url = {https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239932991_Privacy_and_the_varieties_of_informational_wrongdoing},
year = {1997},
date = {1997-09-01},
abstract = {The communitarian diagnosis of our moral predicament goes deeper than just pointing to crime and free-riding as the collat- eral damage of the volatility and superficiality of modern life. It questions the very viability of the liberal conception of the self, which is so central to much of modern ethical theory and politi- cal philosophy. The liberal self is -as Michael Sandel has called it- too much of an "un-encumbered self": a self that makes its choices -including choices about its own identity- in splendid isolation, far from a community and a world that is already there, a self which has no constitutive attachments and preceeds the forma- tion of its own identity. The liberal conception of the self is thus voluntaristic (San&l), disengaged (Taylor) and radically un-situ- ated (Benhabib). So insisting on a moral right to privacy seems doubly wrong from a communitarian perspective: the subject of the right -being a figment of Enlightenment philosophy - does not exist strictly speaking, and the protection it offers is not worth wanting, if not clearly undesirable. What we need therefore is not just a matter of a counterexample proof definition of privacy, it is a matter of de- fending a whole philosophical tradition called liberalism and ar- guing for the plausibility and acceptability of the conception of the self that comes with it.
},
keywords = {moral constraints, panoptic technologies, philosophy, privacy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The communitarian diagnosis of our moral predicament goes deeper than just pointing to crime and free-riding as the collat- eral damage of the volatility and superficiality of modern life. It questions the very viability of the liberal conception of the self, which is so central to much of modern ethical theory and politi- cal philosophy. The liberal self is -as Michael Sandel has called it- too much of an "un-encumbered self": a self that makes its choices -including choices about its own identity- in splendid isolation, far from a community and a world that is already there, a self which has no constitutive attachments and preceeds the forma- tion of its own identity. The liberal conception of the self is thus voluntaristic (San&l), disengaged (Taylor) and radically un-situ- ated (Benhabib). So insisting on a moral right to privacy seems doubly wrong from a communitarian perspective: the subject of the right -being a figment of Enlightenment philosophy - does not exist strictly speaking, and the protection it offers is not worth wanting, if not clearly undesirable. What we need therefore is not just a matter of a counterexample proof definition of privacy, it is a matter of de- fending a whole philosophical tradition called liberalism and ar- guing for the plausibility and acceptability of the conception of the self that comes with it.